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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RENE RUIZ, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 920126-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's argument that magistrates should issue 
nighttime search warrants, and reviewing courts should affirm the 
issuance of no-knock nighttime search warrants, if there is "some 
evidence," but not probable cause justifying the no-knock nighttime 
authorizations, is at odds with Utah statutes and constitutional 
law. 
The warrant in this case failed to meet constitutional 
particularity requirements and was not supported by probable cause. 
The lack of probable cause stems from the fact that the affidavit 
supporting the warrant refers to two separate apartments (8 and 18) 
when the warrant authorizes the search of one apartment (8); from 
the undisclosed age of most of the information in the affidavit; and 
from the failure of the affidavit to establish the reliability, 
veracity, and/or bases of knowledge of the confidential informants. 
The warrant should not have authorized a no-knock nighttime search. 
The fact that the magistrate signed this patently defective warrant 
demonstrates that the magistrate was not acting as a neutral and 
detached arbiter of probable cause. 
The State's procedural arguments concerning waiver of 
issues and the propriety of summary affirmance are factually and 
legally unpersuasive. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT 
DE NOVO. WITHOUT DEFERENCE TO THE MAGISTRATE. 
In response to Mr. Ruiz's contention that this Court should 
review the search warrant affidavit in his case without deference to 
the magistrate and determine whether the affidavit provided probable 
cause for the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant, the 
State argues that 1) Mr. Ruiz's legal authority is wanting, 2) 
police deserve deference because they have expertise in performing 
searches and are "the ones at risk" in serving the warrants, and 3) 
the non-deferential "some evidence" standard proposed by the State 
will promote consistent results. Respondent's brief at 15-16. 
The State's complaint about lack of authority for de novo 
review of no-knock nighttime search warrants is based on a 
misperception that Mr. Ruiz is challenging solely the means of 
executing the search warrant in this case, and is not challenging 
probable cause for the search warrant.1 
1. See Respondent's brief at 14-15 ("[Weaver] deals solely 
with the question of probable cause to issue a warrant. This issue, 
again, is not presented on this appeal."). See also Respondent's 
brief at 3 ("[D]efendant does not challenge the underlying probable 
cause finding."). 
-2 -
To the extent that Judge Orme's Weaver concurrence might be 
limited in scope to the review of probable cause for search 
warrants, rather than to the review of no-knock and nighttime 
authorizations, it is persuasive in this case, where probable cause 
for the warrant is challenged and lacking. One aspect of Mr. Ruiz's 
no probable cause argument, discussed at pages 7, 20, 21 and 23-24 
of his opening brief, is that the search warrant affidavit refers to 
two separate apartments — #8 and #18, while the warrant authorizes 
the search for one apartment — #8. Another aspect of Mr. Ruiz's no 
probable cause argument, discussed at pages 21 and 22 of the opening 
brief, is that the affidavit fails to show an adequate basis of 
knowledge for and the credibility of the confidential informants. 
Another aspect of Mr. Ruiz's no probable cause argument, discussed 
at page 22 of the opening brief, is that the majority of the 
information in the affidavit is not tied to any date demonstrating 
probable cause at the time of the search. Further, the warrant 
fails to meet constitutional particularity requirements. As is 
discussed at pages 19 and 20 of his opening brief, the warrant 
authorizes the search for and seizure of "U.S. Currency, and all 
items which are determined to be collateral or proceeds from 
narcotics transactions," granting the police total discretion to 
search for and seize virtually anything they pleased. The 
discrepancy between the apartments mentioned in the affidavit and 
the warrant also demonstrates a lack of constitutional 
particularity. Because the issuance of the warrant was improper, 
regardless of the no-knock nighttime authorizations, Judge Orme's 
-3 -
Weaver concurrence continues to be persuasive authority for 
straightforward non-deferential review of the warrant in this case. 
Additional authority for the proposition that reviewing 
courts owe no deference to magistrates in reviewing the issuance of 
no-knock nighttime search warrants is found in State v. Humphrey, 
823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
district courts are to review magistrates# probable cause findings 
without deference in the context of bindover orders. Id. at 466. 
Magistrates are ministerial officers who do not act as courts, and 
courts have the capacity and should have the obligation to review 
the magistrates' legal conclusions as to probable cause for search 
warrants by reviewing the information falling within the four 
corners of any search warrant and affidavit to determine whether the 
evidence upon which a criminal case is premised was legally seized. 
Cf. Humphrey at 466-467. 
The State's argument that appellate review should be 
deferential to the magistrates because police have expertise in 
performing searches and are "the ones at risk11 in serving the 
warrants, respondent's brief at 15, is flawed. Assuming arguendo 
that police deserve deference in obtaining no-knock nighttime 
authorizations, such deference would not carry over to the 
magistrates' probable cause determinations in issuing warrants 
because magistrates must be separate, neutral and detached from the 
police, and reviewing courts must insure this rule. E.g. Allen v. 
Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939). The police are not the only ones 
at risk in the execution of warrants. Courts have historically been 
-4 
alert to the need for careful consideration of no-knock nighttime 
searches because the courts have recognized that no-knock nighttime 
searches threaten the safety of not only the police, but also of the 
suspects and innocent bystanders and property and privacy and 
solitude. See brief of appellant at 17. Furthermore, an officer's 
willingness to endanger herself does not earn the officer carte 
blanche to override the constitutions, or absolve the courts of 
their duties to see that the officer comports with her duty to 
conduct herself within constitutional bounds. See id. 
The State's argument that the non-deferential "some 
evidence" standard proposed by the State would promote consistent 
results, respondent's brief at 16, is correct in that the standard 
would allow the State to successfully defend the issuance of 
no-knock nighttime authorizations in virtually every case. Such 
whitewashing would be inconsistent with numerous Fourth Amendment 
values, including the preservation of the integrity of the courts. 
See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990)(courts should not 
be party to lawless invasions of citizens' rights); State v. Vigil, 
815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah App. 1991)(development of common law 
is best served when appellate courts fully engage all appellate 
resources). 
In short, this Court should hold under Article I section 14 
of the Utah Constitution that courts reviewing the issuance of 
no-knock nighttime search warrants are to do so by simply reading 
the search warrants and affidavits, to determine if there is 
-5 -
probable cause for the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search 
warrants. Brief of appellant at 8-13. 
II. 
MAGISTRATES MUST HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO ISSUE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANTS. 
The State argues that while search warrants must be 
supported by probable cause, when Utah magistrates authorize the 
nighttime execution of the warrants, magistrates should not require 
probable cause for the nighttime authorizations, but merely require 
"some evidence," or evidence meeting a "reasonable suspicion" 
standard. Respondent's brief at 12-14. It is the State's rationale 
that because a finding of probable cause must underlie the issuance 
of a warrant, and because a warrant will result in some intrusion on 
one's privacy rights, magistrates should defer to the police as to 
the manner of execution of warrants once some intrusion has been 
justified by a search warrant based on probable cause. Respondent's 
brief at 12-13. In other words, as long as there is probable cause 
for warrants, magistrates should not much concern themselves with 
whether a police officer approaches a home in the daytime, knocks on 
the door, explains her authority and purpose, and proceeds to 
search, or whether a team of unidentifiable police officers go 
breaking and entering into and looting a person's home with guns 
drawn in the middle of the night. 
The State and Federal Constitutions both explicitly require 
reasonable searches and probable cause for all search warrants. 
Because no-knock nighttime searches are more intrusive, more 
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dangerous and more prone to constitutional unreasonableness than 
other searches, the constitutions and logic compel as a minimum a 
showing of probable cause to justify no-knock nighttime search 
warrants, and certainly do not tolerate the miniscule "some 
evidence" standard proposed by the State.2 
The cases the State cites in support of its "some evidence" 
standard are inapposite or misinterpreted. In Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), cited in respondent's brief at 13, the 
Court held, in pertinent part, that the Fourth Amendment did not 
require courts issuing wiretap orders under federal law to 
explicitly authorize covert entry for installation of the wiretap 
equipment. Id. at 257-259. Dalia's holding does not support the 
argument that magistrates should defer to the police in no-knock 
nighttime search warrant cases because the facts at issue in 
wiretapping are different from the facts at issue in no-knock 
nighttime cases. Covert entry is essential to any successful 
wiretap and would necessarily be considered by a judge issuing a 
wiretap order, and covert entry does not pose the dangers that 
inhere in no-knock nighttime searches. See LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, supplement §4.8 at 53-54. 
United States v. Searp. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), does 
not support the State's "some evidence" standard, but demonstrates 
why the Dalia wiretap analysis does not apply in the context of 
nighttime searches. In Searp. the police obtained at night 
2. See generally Lafave, Search and Seizure, §§4.7 and 4.8 
at pages 260, 263-276, 270-280, 287-290; supplement, §4.8 at 49-54. 
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a warrant authorizing an immediate search of a woman's home, but 
failed to obtain an explicit authorization for a nighttime search. 
Id. at 1121-1122. The court held that the officers violated federal 
law in executing the search warrant at night without obtaining an 
explicit nighttime authorization. Id. While the State's quotation 
of Searp at page 14 of the respondent's brief is correct, when read 
in context, it demonstrates the Searp Court's awareness of the need 
for careful consideration of nighttime searches by those issuing 
nighttime warrants. The opinion states, 
The federal Rule requires explicit authorization 
for a night search, and "reasonable cause shown" 
to the issuing magistrate justifying the unusual 
intrusion of a search at night. . . . The Rule 
requires only some factual basis for a prudent 
conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a 
nighttime search is justified by the exigencies 
of the situation. The procedural reguirements of 
the Rule ensure that the fact that a nighttime 
search is contemplated by the police is brought 
to the attention of a magistrate and that he or 
she consciously decide whether such a 
particularly abrasive instrusion is called for in 
a given situation. 
Id. at 1121 (emphasis added). Rather than assuming that the judge 
who signed the warrant at 11:27 p.m. to be executed immediately had 
necessarily considered the nighttime execution of the warrant, as 
would have been done under a Dalia approach, the Searp court 
indicated that a record of the judge's explicit consideration of an 
adequate justification for an intrusive nighttime search was 
essential. The court stated, 
In this case, even if we were to accept the 
argument that the preprinted word "immediately" 
meant more than the phrase "forthwith," commonly 
used in warrants, and could suffice as explicit 
-8 -
authority for a night search in a warrant issued 
at night, there is no record of any "reasonable 
cause shown" to justify a nighttime search. The 
affidavit contains no request for a night search, 
and discloses no facts which would justify such a 
search, particularly of a private home occupied 
by a lone woman who was not suspected of being a 
participant in the crime. 
To hold under these circumstances that there 
has been compliance would eviscerate a federal 
rule intended to be a substantial protection 
against unnecessarily abrasive behavior by the 
police. . . . The Rule is so constructed that it 
simply cannot be complied with by chance, because 
it requires, first, conscious recognition and 
consideration of the fact that an extraordinary 
search is contemplated, and secondly, some record 
of that consideration in the affidavits and the 
warrant itself. 
Id. at 1121-1122 (emphasis added). 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990), does explain 
the reasonable suspicion standard, respondent's brief at 13, a 
standard that must be met in order to justify an officer's detention 
and questioning of a citizen. Menke, however, does nothing to 
justify the State's position that this standard, or a "some 
evidence" standard, should be the threshold to justify a nighttime 
search, which radically exceeds the scope of a level two Terry stop. 
The State cites State v. Lee 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981), 
for the proposition that "[e]fforts to avoid the detection of 
criminal activity do not create a[n] expectation that such activity 
will remain 'private.'" Respondent's brief at 14. Lee is a plain 
view case, wherein the defendant had placed stolen property in the 
back of his truck, where the property was clearly visible through a 
window. It was in this context that the court explained that Mr. 
-9 -
Lee's mere desire to avoid detection of criminal activity was an 
insufficient basis to establish a privacy interest in the property, 
which Mr. Lee had left in the officer's plain view. Id. at 51. Lee 
is inapposite to the State's argument that magistrates should issue 
no-knock nighttime warrants if there is "some evidence" to justify 
the no-knock nighttime authorizations. 
The State's argument that a reasonable suspicion or "some 
evidence" standard is the appropriate standard for a magistrate to 
follow under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1), which requires 
reasonable cause for a nighttime search fails to appreciate prior 
Utah caselaw. When Utah statutes codify principles of 
constitutional law, such as the need for probable cause to search 
and seize, Utah Courts consistently construe the statutory term 
"reasonable cause" to mean probable cause.3 State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
730 (Utah App. 1991), correctly interprets this statute as requiring 
a particularized showing that a search is required at night because 
of nighttime destruction of property, or for other good reason. Id. 
at 733. 
It is important to note that the State apparently does not 
argue for this reasonable suspicion standard in the issuance of 
no-knock warrants. See Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2)(in order 
to issue a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the 
3. The State cited State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 
(Utah App. 1989)(interpreting warrantless arrest statute). See also 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986)(same); State v. Cole, 674 
P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)(same); and State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 
1259, 1260 (1972)(same). 
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affidavit or supplemental record which provide "proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given.")(emphasis added). 
III. 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND AFFIDAVIT 
WERE FATALLY DEFECTIVE. 
The State argues that the warrant was supported by probable 
cause because of the confidential informant's controlled buy from 
Mr. Ruiz's apartment seven days prior to the search. Respondent's 
brief at 3-4. The controlled buy was from an unspecified person or 
persons in that apartment, and yet the warrant authorized the search 
of Mr. Ruiz and his apartment. Mr. Ruiz's residence in the 
apartment where a controlled buy occurred sometime in the week prior 
to the issuance of the warrant does not necessarily establish 
probable cause to search him or his apartment. See Ybarra v. 
Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)("a search or seizure of a person 
must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to 
that person [and] [t]his requirement cannot be undercut or avoided 
by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists 
probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises 
where the person may happen to be11); Ashley v. State. 241 N.E.2d 264 
(Ind. 1968)(even though probable cause may have once existed for 
searching a building, probable cause no longer exists after an 8 day 
lapse because drugs could have been moved). See also Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-23-3 (stating conditions precedent to and limitation of 
-11-
warrants issued wherein person or entity in possession of illegal 
evidence is not a probable cause suspect). 
More importantly, the State fails to note defects in the 
warrant and affidavit which preclude a finding of probable cause, 
and which demonstrate that the magistrate acted as a rubberstamp in 
signing the search warrant without addressing these defects. 
The State's only mention of the discrepancy between the 
warrant's authorization of a search of apartment #8, and the 
affidavit's reference to apartments #8 and #18 is a waiver argument 
found at page 7 note 2 of the respondent's brief, wherein the State 
refers to Mr, Ruiz's contentions about the discrepancy as a 
"particularity argument." The waiver aspect of the State's argument 
is addressed in Point IV of this brief, but the State's limited view 
of the legal impact of the discrepancy must be addressed. The 
discrepancy demonstrates a failure of the warrant to meet 
constitutional particularity requirements. See e.g. Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)("[W]arrants must particularly 
describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be 
searched.")(citation omitted). However, the discrepancy also 
demonstrates that the magistrate was not acting as a neutral and 
detached arbiter of probable cause in signing the warrant without 
addressing the discrepancy. See e.g. id. ("[W]arrants must be 
issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates."). The discrepancy 
also goes to the absence of probable cause for the search and the 
no-knock nighttime authorizations. The information in the affidavit 
relating to apartment #8 mentions one controlled buy by a 
-12-
confidential informant from (an) unspecified person(s). The 
information in the affidavit relating to rumors of a Rene Montoya 
dealing in large quantities of drugs, threatening to use a gun to 
protect his drugs, and countersurveillance is tied to apartment 
#18. See brief of appellant at 20-21; Dalia, supra (w[T]hose 
seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their 
probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a 
particular apprehension or conviction for a particular 
offense.")(citations omitted). 
The State's characterization of Mr. Ruiz's contentions 
about the warrant's authorization of a search for "U.S. Currency, 
and all items which are determined to be collateral or proceeds from 
narcotics transactions" as a particularity argument again places an 
undue limitation on the legal impact of the defect. While this 
phrase in the warrant did transform the warrant into an illegal 
general warrant, in violation of the particularity rule, see Dalia, 
supra. the fact that the magistrate signed the warrant without 
questioning or eliminating this improper language demonstrates a 
failure of the magistrate to function as a neutral and detached 
arbiter of probable cause, as well. Id. Again the State does not 
respond on the merits to the overbreadth of the warrant, but relies 
on a waiver argument in a footnote, which will be addressed in Point 
IV of this brief. 
The State makes no response whatsoever to Mr. Ruiz's 
contention that the affidavit is deficient in probable cause because 
it provides an inadequate showing of the reliability, veracity, 
-13-
and/or bases of knowledge of the confidential informants. See 
appellant's brief at 21-22. 
The State makes no response whatsoever to Mr. Ruiz's 
contention that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause at 
the time of the search because the majority of the information in 
the affidavit is not tied to any date. See appellant's brief at 22. 
The State's argument that the no-knock nighttime search was 
appropriate because of reports of countersurveillance, and the 
State's inference that the countersurveillance meant that evidence 
would be destroyed if the officers approached in the daytime, 
respondent's brief at 17, fail to note that the countersurveillance 
was apparently observed at night, logically counselling against a 
nighttime execution of the warrant. See appellant's brief at 24-25. 
The State's argument that the no-knock nighttime search was 
proper because of the informants' statements that Rene was armed and 
would defend his drugs, overlooks the fact that this information was 
tied to apartment #18 in the affidavit, while the warrant authorized 
search of apartment #8. See Appellant's brief at 23-24. The 
State's reliance on the officer's general accusation that drug 
dealers are frequently armed, respondent's brief at 17, fails to 
account for the rule that a magistrate issuing a warrant must do so 
on the basis of independent facts, and may not rely on the general 
beliefs of the officer. E.g. Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920, 
924-925 (Utah 1939)("A warrant to search and seize, which follows 
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of the affiant, rests 
-14-
upon the reasoning of the affiant, based upon the secret facts of 
which he may have knowledge, and the conclusion which results from 
such reasoning is affiant's, not that of the judicial officer. The 
judicial process to ascertain probable cause is then transferred 
from the judicial officer to the affiant. The Constitution permits 
no such thing.")(citation omitted). See also Giordanello v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958) (arrest warrant); Acruilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964); Nathanson v. United States. 
290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). 
IV. 
THIS CASE IS PROCEDURALLY RIPE 
FOR REVERSAL ON THE MERITS. 
Despite the fact that the specifics of the trial court's 
ruling were never resolved in the trial court and therefore are not 
before this court on review, see opening brief of appellant at 3 n.l 
and respondent's brief at 6 n.l, the State argues that Mr. Ruiz may 
not address various issues before this Court because they were 
waived in the trial court. The State argues that Mr. Ruiz has 
waived the issue concerning the absence of justification for the 
no-knock authorization, and that Mr. Ruiz has also waived issues 
relating to the discrepancy between the apartment number identified 
in the warrant and the apartment numbers in the affidavit, and to 
the warrant's authorization of a general search and seizure. 
Respondent's brief at 7 and n.l. 
The first reason to reject the waiver arguments is that in 
reviewing the issuance of search warrants, this Court reviews the 
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search warrant and affidavit, without regard to the trial court's 
analysis. E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991). 
While the focus of the argument in the trial court was on 
the nighttime authorization, the motion to suppress alleged 
violations of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the nighttime 
statute, and referred to and provided a copy of State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which 
fully discusses the issuance of no-knock nighttime warrants. The 
parties repeatedly indicated that it was proper for the trial court 
to consider all materials within the warrant and affidavit, which 
were both presented to the trial court fe.g. T. 4, 10). The parties 
discussed the justification for the no-knock authorization before 
the trial court fe.g. T. 18), and the trial court referred to the 
no-knock justification in the search warrant affidavit during the 
argument and in his ruling (T. 10, 13, 21), discussed the dangers 
posed by no-knock nighttime searches (T. 12, 18-19), and discussed 
what the court perceived as evidence of a need for a no-knock 
warrant in this case (T. 14, 21). The trial court apparently 
reviewed the entire warrant and affidavit, and eventually ruled that 
the warrant was properly issued (T. 18-21). The trial court had a 
full opportunity to address the shortcomings in the warrant and 
affidavit, and this Court need not refer to the court's analysis in 
reviewing the search warrant and affidavit. Weaver, supra. 
Even if the waiver doctrine could apply to arguments about 
the contents of a search warrant and affidavit on review before this 
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Court, the shortcomings in this affidavit and warrant are plain on 
the face of the documents before this Court, and would merit plain 
error review. See Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) (explaining plain 
error doctrine); State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. 
denied. 493 U.S. 813 (1989)(same). 
The State's argument that this Court's disposition of this 
case on the merits would result in an advisory opinion because the 
parties stipulated not to present evidence concerning the execution 
of the search warrant (T.6/14/91 4), respondent's brief at 11, fails 
to appreciate the distinction between challenges to the issuance of 
warrants, which seek to correct errant magistrates (and police 
presenting the defective warrants and affidavits), and challenges to 
the reasonableness of the execution of searches, which seek to 
correct police misbehavior. See Utah Constitution Article I section 
14 (requiring both reasonable searches and the proper issuance of 
warrants); United States Constitution, Amendment IV (same). E.g. 
State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah App. 1988)(defendant 
challenged search warrant for lack of probable cause established in 
the supporting affidavit, and the reasonableness of the search of 
his person). Mr. Ruiz is not challenging the reasonableness of the 
search; he is arguing that the search should not have occurred at 
all because the warrant and affidavit were deficient and should not 
have been issued by the magistrate. 
The State cites States v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), 
and People v. Barber. 449 N.Y.S.2d 140 (N.Y.App. Div. 1982), for the 
proposition that the absence of evidence that the police conducted a 
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no-knock nighttime search in this case precludes this Court from 
addressing the propriety of the magistrate's issuance of the 
no-knock nighttime warrant. Respondent's brief at 8-9. Neither 
Buck nor Barber establishes a burden on a defendant challenging the 
issuance of a search warrant to make an evidentiary showing of the 
execution of the search. If the State wished to contest Mr. Ruiz's 
motion by showing that the warrant was not executed as authorized, 
the State should have presented the necessary evidence in the trial 
court. Compare the stipulation of the parties in this case that no 
evidence was necessary to the motion (T.6/14/91 4), with State v. 
Buck. 756 P.2d at 701 (evidence demonstrated facts of execution of 
search), and People v. Barber at 145 (same). 
The State's argument that this Court is not in a position 
to evaluate the propriety of excluding the evidence in the absence 
of the facts surrounding the execution of the warrant, respondent's 
brief at 10, fails to recognize that it is the State's burden to 
establish facts demonstrating an exception to the exclusionary rule, 
which applies because Mr. Ruiz has demonstrated a fourth amendment 
violation. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).4 
In the instant case, Mr. Ruiz moved to suppress the 
evidence seized by the police, alleging violations of his statutory 
4. The good faith exception would not apply in this case 
because the magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a neutral and 
detached magistrate, because the warrant is lacking in 
particularity, and because the warrant was so deficient that an 
officer could not reasonably rely on it. United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
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rights and his fourth amendment and Article I section 14 rights. In 
support of this motion, the trial court received in evidence a copy 
of the search warrant and affidavit. Mr. Ruiz has carried his 
burden in his challenge to the warrant and affidavit. State v. 
Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978). 
V. 
SUPPRESSION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
The State challenges State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah 
App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), arguing that 
suppression of evidence may not be necessary in cases involving 
improper nighttime searches. Respondent's brief at 10 and n.3. 
Rowe correctly recognizes that violation of the nighttime 
search warrant requirements requires suppression of evidence, given 
the historical recognition of the dangers and extreme intrusions 
posed by nighttime searches. Id. at 738-739 and accompanying 
notes. The Rowe court properly recognized that suppression is the 
appropriate remedy under the Utah statutory scheme, and also 
properly recognized that the Utah statutory scheme may codify 
constitutional law governing nighttime searches. Id. In his 
concurring Rowe opinion, Judge Garff correctly reiterated the need 
for a magistrate's careful examination of nighttime search warrants 
prior to their issuance. Id. at 740. 
It appears that under the Utah statutory scheme, 
suppression is the presumptive remedy for violations of the search 
warrants chapter. The legislature explicitly notes when violations 
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of the chapter shall not result in suppression, implicitly presuming 
suppression for other violations. Compare Utah Code Ann. section 
77-23-6 ("Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render the 
evidence seized inadmissible at trial.11) with Utah Code Ann. section 
77-23-10(2)(no-knock statute; does not prohibit suppression), and 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1)(nighttime statute; does not 
prohibit suppression).5 
The cases upon which the State relies in challenging Rowe 
were not decided under the Utah search and seizure statutory scheme, 
do not involve the improper issuance of no-knock nighttime search 
warrants, and are thus inapposite.6 
Given the state constitutional rights to life, privacy, 
property and the proper issuance of warrants, which are all at stake 
in no-knock nighttime search cases, this Court should hold under 
5. While Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-12 indicates that 
"property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be 
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceedings unless the 
unlawful conduct of the peace officer is shown to be substantial," 
it appears that this statute, which is part of the Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement Act, is no longer in effect, inasmuch as the Utah 
Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a different provision of 
the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, and the act indicates that the 
provisions are not severable, but fall together if one provision is 
stricken. See State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987). 
6. See State v. Fixel. 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-1369 (Utah 
1987)(case involved police officer acting outside of his statutory 
geographical jurisdiction; did not involve constitutional violation; 
"Unfortunately, the legislature has not seen fit to enact a 
statutory remedy."); United States v. Searp. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 
1978)(case involved police officers performing nighttime search 
without warrant authorization, in violation of federal rule). 
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Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that suppression is 
the appropriate remedy for the improper issuance of no-knock 
nighttime search warrants.7 This rule will encourage police and 
prosecutors to seek no-knock nighttime search warrants in properly 
limited circumstances and to do so carefully, and will also 
encourage magistrates to review the affidavits seeking no-knock 
nighttime searches with appropriate care.8 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Ruiz's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
7. See Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 ("All men 
have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property[.],f) ; 
Article I section 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law."); Article I section 14 
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."). 
8. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), 
Appendix at 741-743 (history of federal exclusionary rule and public 
policy call for suppression in cases involving improper issuance of 
warrants); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987)(court 
reserves judgment on whether or not United States Supreme Court 
correctly views the purpose of the exclusionary rule as solely to 
prevent police misconduct); State v. LaRocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-73 
(Utah 1990)(plurality)(noting that federal exclusionary rule has 
been viewed as not only deterring police misconduct, but also as a 
constitutionally-required constitutional enforcement mechanism, and 
reserving question of purposes to be served by Utah exclusionary 
rule, which, unlike the federal fourth amendment exclusionary rule, 
currently applies whenever Article I section 14 is violated). 
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